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Abstract 
 
This paper adapts the traditional model of migration to include human capital, housing prices 
and a region's infrastructure in order to analyse the determinants of migration in the Spanish 
regions between 1998-2003. Using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations [SURE] 
model, results indicate that regional differences in the following variables help explain the 
patterns of internal migration: wages, unemployment, infrastructure (health, education and 
transport), housing prices. Human capital is also a significant explanatory variable.  
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. 1. Introduction 
 
Spanish inter-regional migration has, by international comparison, been low for many 
decades. Many studies have shown it to be unresponsive to traditional explanatory variables, 
such as inter-regional disparities in wages and unemployment.  The potential contribution of 
labour mobility, including inter-regional migration, to productivity improvements at the 
national level is well understood (Fonseca 2002) yet the rigidities of labour markets has 
sometimes proved a stumbling block (Bentolila 1997).  The motivation of this paper is to 
explore whether regional migration within Spain continues to defy economic reasoning or, on 
the contrary, is indeed responsive to a range of economic incentives, extending beyond the 
traditional labour market variables. We do so by applying appropriate econometric modelling 
to contemporary data.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part 2 provides the theoretical under-
pinning. Part 3 summarises existing research. Part 4 gives the empirical specification and its 
results. Part 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Model. 
 
It has been observed on the basis of empirical evidence that the potential contribution 
of migration to greater productive national performance of Spain is well understood (Fonseca 
2002) yet the rigidities of labour markets has proved a stumbling block (Bentolila 1997). The 
following diagrams explain the nature and size of efficiency gains [measured in terms of 
aggregate output ] due to labour mobility within a country. We show that in theory, migration 
is welfare–enhancing if the real wages are flexible as net output gains are positive (see figure 
1). If real wages are rigid, gains from migration could be negative due to net output losses 
(see figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Rural to Urban Migration with High Real Wage Flexibility. 
 
 
 
 
The importance of real wage flexibility for migration is illustrated in figures 1 and 2. Assume 
for the moment that in an initial migration equilibrium the size of the workforce in the urban 
and rural sectors is equal (OA in the figures). Suppose that a number BA leave agriculture 
and migrate to the cities increasing the urban workforce by AC=BA. With some real wage 
flexibility the BRW curve shifts to BRW' and urban employment increases by AD<AC 
increasing unemployment by DC in that sector. 
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 Figure 2. Rural to Urban Migration with Low Real Wage Flexibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
The welfare implications of migration can be assessed by comparing the increase in urban 
output, area ADHG, with the drop in rural output, area BAFE (both in terms of units of 
industrial output). Starting from this initial migration equilibrium rural to urban migration by 
an increment BA is welfare enhancing if ADHG > BAFE + costs of migration as in Fig. 1.  
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The two figures compare the case of a relatively high degree of responsiveness of the 
urban real wage to unemployment (see figure 1 where migration increases welfare as 
net output gains are positive) with a very low degree of responsiveness (see figure 2). In 
the latter case (which is close to that of a fixed real wage as in HT) area ADHG < area 
BAFE and urban bias exists. Migration can reduce welfare in terms of net output loss as 
ADGH < BAFE .   
 
In the following sections, we extend the HT type of theoretical model to 
incorporate the effects of the educational level of migrants and regional amenities. One 
of the major reasons for such an extension is to remove the well- acknowledged 
criticisms of the HT model that it fails to include the role of human capital and regional 
amenities in migration decisions. Recall that in the HT model probabilities of 
employment of both the educated and the uneducated are the same in the urban sector. 
Further, HT assume boldly that regional amenities and locational factors do not matter. 
Clearly, such assumptions are  unrealistic. We first present the basic model and then we 
include the extensions. 
 
 Let there be two regions, a home region from which population can migrate to a 
target region. Finding employment in the target region is uncertain, thus, the expected 
utility of migration is given by 
 
  C
r
UbPUaP
CdteUbPUaP rt 



 )1()1(
0
 ,             (2.1) 
 
where Ua is the flow rate for utility derived from employment in the formal sector of the 
target region and P is the probability of finding such employment. Ub is the utility of 
being unemployed, which can be interpreted as either the utility obtained from receiving 
unemployment benefits or that of being employed in the informal sector. Finally, C are 
the direct costs of migration. The utility of staying in the home region is  
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where Uh is the flow rate for utility when staying in the home region. Migration will 
only take place if (2.1) is greater than (2.2).  
 
In the basic model, utilities reflect only wages / benefits (W) in their respective 
region and sector. Thus, Ua=Wa, Ub=Wb, Uh=Wh. As mentioned above, Wb can be 
interpreted as either wages in the informal sector or unemployment benefits. Migration 
will take place only if 
WhrCWbPWaP  )1( .                                       (2.3) 
 
The probability of finding employment, P, depends on the unemployment level 
in the target region and is given by 
NhmNa
L
P

 ,                                                 (2.4) 
 
where L is employed population, Na is total labour force in the target region, Nh is 
population in the home region and m is the proportion of the home population who have 
chosen to emigrate. L can be interpreted as the number of job vacancies available in 
target region by assuming that migrants can compete on equal terms with the incumbent 
employed population for such vacancies. As new migrants arrive, the probability of 
employment decreases until the expected utility of migrating equals the utility of 
remaining in the home region. 
 
 We assume Wa-rC>Wh and Wa>Wb. The former assumption is required for 
migration to take place, while the latter follows from the definition of both sectors. We 
also require that there is no incentive for leaving the home region for unemployment in 
the target region, i.e. Wb-rC<Wh. If this were not the case, the equilibrium migration 
rate would be 100% as any of the possible two states that migrants could face would be 
better than not migrating. The equilibrium extent of migration can be obtained from 
(2.3) and (2.4) as follows 
)(
)()(
rCWbWhNh
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m


  .                        (2.5) 
 
 Therefore, for positive migration, we require that inequality (2.6) hold. It implies 
that the expected income in the target region prior to the arrival of migrants exceed the 
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income in the home region by at least the costs of migration. The higher the 
employment rate, the higher the chances of a positive equilibrium migration rate. 
rCWhWb
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 We can see the traditional results of the H-T model. Any increase in wages in 
the target region would increase unemployment. In addition, from (2.5) we obtain the 
familiar results: 
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 Our extension starts with the introduction of a new assumption. In traditional 
H-T models the more educated have the same probability of obtaining employment as 
the less educated, which may not be realistic. We therefore assume that the probability 
of finding employment is also a function of the endowment of human capital, i.e. the 
level of education of migrants, HC. Therefore, we rewrite such probability as 
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thus the more educated have more chances of obtaining employment. Let HC be 
normalised to the interval (0,1), and assume a multiplicative form, then we can write 
(2.8) as 
NhmNa
L
HCP

 .                                            (2.9) 
 If migrants possess the minimum possible educational level, i.e. HC=0, then 
employment becomes impossible as P=0. If migrants possess the maximum level of 
education, i.e. HC=1, then P depends uniquely on the level of employment. HC is 
therefore the sensitivity of the probability of finding employment with respect to the 
level of employment. 
 In addition, migrants may not only value wages when making their decisions. 
Regional amenities, such as provision of public schooling, infrastructure, price of 
housing and health services may also enter migrants’ utility function. We assume that 
they do so additively. Let Aa and Ah be vectors of regional amenities in target and 
home region respectively. Formally, 
  halwithAAAA lklll ,..., 21                                   (2.10). 
 The utility of regional amenities is given by the following functions: 
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Hence, we can rewrite the equilibrium condition as 
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 We still require the condition of no incentive for migration to unemployment in 
order to obtain an equilibrium m<1, such condition is now (Wb-Wh)+(UAa-UAh)<rC.  
We can obtain the equilibrium migration rate from (2.12). 
 
 
 rCUAUAWbWhNh
rCUAUAWhWbNaWbWaLHC
m
ah
ha



)()(
)()()(
            (2.13) 
 A positive equilibrium migration rate requires that inequality (2.14) hold. The 
difference between wages in the formal sector and Wb, corrected for human capital and 
unemployment, must be greater than the difference in utility between staying in the 
home region and migrating for unemployment. Wages and unemployment gaps are 
therefore not definite factors explaining the direction of migration flows. No matter how 
high wages in the target region are, or if full employment holds, if human capital is low 
or amenities gap is high in favour of the home region, migration will not take place.  
 rCUAUAWbWhWbWa
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 We can observe the sensitivity of M with respect to all variables in the model 
through the following partial derivatives: 
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 Therefore, any marginal increase in the educational level of migrants, wages or 
amenities in the target region will increase migration. Furthermore, any marginal 
increase in wages or amenities in home region will decrease migration. 
 
3.  Literature review 
   
Spanish inter-regional migration has been low by international comparison since the 
1970s. For some of this period it was actually falling. The literature is not totally 
consistent in its explanation for this phenomenon though much of it has pointed to the 
lack of migration response to traditional variables. Jimeno and Bentolila (1998), for 
example, conclude that "inter-regional migration flows and regional labour participation 
decisions are scarcely responsive to regional real wages and employment". They also 
indicate that the Spanish migration response to demand shocks has been low compared 
to that of the US and the EU. Lindley et alia (2002 p28), who have the most pessimistic 
evaluation of the Spanish migration tendency, claim that "Spain is effectively an 
economy with almost no migration" and that there is moreover "evidence, consistent 
with previous work, that migration is actually negatively related to the regional 
unemployment rate".  
 
Econometric investigation into the explanatory factors causing migration have found 
variables that have been wrongly signed, unexpectedly insignificant, or with low 
elasticity. For Antolin and Bover (1997) the regional unemployment differential and 
wages variables are perverse (counter-intuitive). Bentolila (1997) argues that migration 
among Spanish regions fell significantly since the 1970s, in spite of large and widening 
regional unemployment rate differentials. Bentolila and Dolado (1991) find that a 
region's relative wage and relative unemployment differential  (elasticity very low 
again) do cause some (small) net migration to that region. Relative employment growth, 
however, was not a significant variable. Lindley et alia  (2002) also find the regional 
unemployment variable to be perverse.   
 
Antolin and Bover (1997), finding traditional economic explanatory variables such as 
unemployment and wages problematic (for example their regional unemployment 
differential was wrongly signed), tested for personal characteristics as the key to the 
 10 
puzzle. The regional unemployment differential was found to have a different effect on 
individuals of differing circumstances. Higher education levels were found to promote 
migration responses, while having children or living with relatives reduced it. Very 
importantly they found that while the non-registered unemployed do respond, the 
employed scarcely respond (unless highly educated) while the least responsive are the 
registered unemployed, i.e. receivers of benefits. They conclude that the Spanish labour 
market (registered unemployed) is not responding to personal or regional 
unemployment. 
 
Jaurez (2000) is an example of how more flexible measurement of variables - e.g. gross 
instead of net migration flows between regions, or the rate of change in relative wages 
instead of the differentials in regional wages - has been required to produce more 
encouraging results. He finds, contrary to the trend of the literature, that from 1963-93 
regional  labour migration was partially responsive to regional economic variables.  For 
example regions with high unemployment would tend to produce outward migration, 
though only up to a certain level, after which the effect would be reduced, probably 
because very high national unemployment figures would discourage most internal 
migration. Juarez found evidence of inward migration to regions with higher rates of 
employment creation and to where wages were growing at a relatively higher rate.  
 
Given the manifest difficulties with the inter-regional data, some research has focused 
on intra-regional migration. Such investigation requires less accessible data sources 
(e.g. Social Security records and administrative micro-data sets on migrants).  Bover 
and Arrellano (2002) pointed out there had been a "remarkable" increase in intra-
regional migration and found that a series of economic determinants were indeed 
significant in explaining such migration within a region. These included unemployment, 
housing prices, the education level of migrant, and employment in the service industry. 
However wages were not found to be a significant explanatory variable.  Devillanova 
and Garcia-Fontes (1998) testing for  migration between provinces (a sub-regional 
category)  and measuring gross rather than net flows,  found that  before 1986 migration 
did not respond to  economic incentives (e.g. unemployment rate and employment 
growth differentials) but that from 1986-1992 there was some response. For example 
out-migration from a province would occur in response to higher unemployment - 
especially from the agricultural to service sector areas. However its elasticity was low 
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and, strangely, it would be to areas with higher than average housing prices and lower 
than average wages. This was not the first time in the literature that the sign on wages 
was counter-intuitive (Antolin and Bover 1997). The only consistent finding throughout 
the literature, and this is at both the inter-regional  and intra-regional level, is that more 
highly qualified workers tended to migrate more than the less qualified in response to 
economic incentives (Garcia. et alia 1999, Mauro and Spolimbergo 1999). However 
although Devillanova and Garcia's results were encouraging, significant dummy 
variables in source provinces were found to be significant. This gave their results only 
partial validity.  Further explanation was required. 
 
Explanations for this state of affairs point mainly to the rigidities of the Spanish labour 
market.  For example  regional wage flexibility is claimed to be low in Spain due to the 
impact of national wages (Jimeno and Bentolila 1998). Antolin and Bover (1997) 
suggest a number of factors for this state of affairs including: peculiarities of the 
registration system whereby migrants are put at the back of the job queue; privileges of 
the benefits system whereby the registered unemployed are less willing to migrate than 
the employed in response to unemployment; personal characteristics of the unemployed 
(lack of skills, living with relatives or having children). An inefficient "matching" 
process with inadequate information about vacancies at the national level is suggested 
by Lindley et alia (2002), while very high national rates of unemployment have been 
mentioned as discouragement to regional migration by Juarez (2000).  
 
Despite the evident difficulties encountered in the above-mentioned literature this paper 
wishes to look afresh at regional migration in Spain using the latest available regional 
statistics. Although inter-regional migration is still comparatively low in Spain it has 
increased significantly since the mid-1990s (see Fig.1). We have also been encouraged 
by recent research in other countries such as Poland where, despite chronically low or 
even falling rates of internal migration, its dynamics have been explained using an 
expanded set of variables. These include not only wages and unemployment, but also 
human capital, infrastructure and distance (Ghatak et al. 2004). Previous research using 
this combination of variables had also been applied successfully to Russian internal 
migration (Andreinko and Gurief 2003). Our task here is to see if this extended range of 
variables could also explain internal migration in Spain. Specifically we expect Spanish 
regional migration to be positively correlated with regional wage differentials and 
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negatively correlated with unemployment differentials  - the Harris and Todaro (1970) 
hypothesis explaining migration as the result of basic economic incentives. We expect it 
to be positively correlated with regional facilities (roads, health and education), which, 
by augmenting regional productivity and increasing wages, constitute agglomeration 
economies and act as magnets for migration - the Tiebolt (1956) hypothesis,  tested 
successfully by Andrienko and Gurief (2003) and Ghatak et alia (2004).  We expect it to 
be negatively correlated with the relative distance of migration (a proxy for its cost) - 
the Hatton-Williams (1998) hypothesis. We expect, and this time totally in accord with 
all previous research on Spanish internal migration, that human capital is positively 
correlated with regional migration, indicating that the higher skilled and better educated 
are more inclined to emigrate (Dustmann 1995; Ghatak 2001, 2003). Housing prices 
have been added to our model, a variable found significant in Bover and Arellano 
(2001) at the inter-regional level. We believe its addition is necessary since the wages 
variable, so often proving counter-intuitive, can only be understood from the point of 
view of the migrant in the context of relative housing prices.  
 
Our data is drawn from INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) and Ministerio de 
Educación y Cultura. 
 
 
4.  Empirical specification and results 
.  For empirical estimation we follow 
k
k
m
kjijt XM

 0 ,                                                     (4.1) 
where Mijt is the amount of migrants moving from region i to region j at time t, Xk are 
explanatory variables, k are parameters to estimate and j are effects related to each 
destination province j that might influence migration but are not captured by 
explanatory variables. Taking the log-linear form of (4.1) results in a fixed effects panel 
data model.  
 Table 4.1 shows all variables used in the log-linear model based on equation 
(4.1). We use a symmetrical model in which variables appear in differences thus 
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assuming that would-be migrants have perfect information about all regions (Taylor and 
Martin 2001). Therefore, variables wages, unemployment, price of housing and regional 
amenities are presented as ratios in which the variable in destination region appears in 
the numerator and that of donor region in the denominator. With respect to regional 
amenities, we use students enrolled in secondary education as a proxy for publicly 
provided education; hospital beds as a proxy of health services; and road density as a 
proxy of infrastructure. Furthermore, we use students enrolled in university education as 
a proxy of human capital. Hence, the latter is only presented for donor regions.  
  
Table 4.1 
Mig Natural logarithm of migration from donor to destination region. 
Wage Natural logarithm of the ratio of wages in destination and donor region.  
Unem Natural logarithm of the ratio of unemployment in destination and donor 
region. 
Dis Natural logarithm of distance between destination and donor region. 
Price Natural logarithm of the ratio of price of housing in destination and donor 
region. 
Univ Natural logarithm of students enrolled in university education per thousand 
population. 
Sec Natural logarithm of the ratio of students enrolled in secondary education in 
destination and donor region per thousand population. 
Beds Natural logarithm of the ratio of hospital beds in destination and donor region 
per thousand population. 
Infra Natural logarithm of the ratio of road density in destination and donor region. 
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 The data is organised as 17 equations each related to a destination region. Each 
region contains 16 observations spanned over 6 years, from 1998 to 2003. Therefore, 
each equation contains 96 observations, resulting in 1632 total observations. Secondary 
education in 2003 data were not available for some regions. Therefore, in order to use a 
balanced panel, data from this year were omitted from models including this variable, 
totalling 1360 observations in this case. 
 Firstly, we obtained OLS estimators from the log-linear version of (4.1). 
However, tests based on the OLS residuals cannot reject the hypothesis of both 
groupwise heteroskedasticity and serial correlation between cross-sections. Hence, OLS 
estimators are not efficient. Given this, Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations 
(SURE) estimators, which would provide efficiency gains over OLS estimators, are 
used. 
 Table A.1. and A.2. show results for four different models. Model 1 includes the 
most traditional economic variables influencing migration: wages, unemployment and 
distance. Model 2 incorporates housing prices, model 3 human capital and model 4 
regional amenities. 
 In model 4, all variables are significant and have the expected signs. 
Furthermore, Wald Coefficient Tests rejects the elimination of variables. Therefore, the 
restricted models 1 through 3 appear as inferior to model 4, which is our preferred 
model. 
 It follows from (4.1) that coefficients estimated are elasticities of migration with 
respect to its variable. We observe in model four that the highest elasticity is that of 
migration with respect to wage differentials, with an elasticity of 3.61. The elasticity of 
migration with respect to housing prices differential follows at -2.41. Therefore, wage 
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and housing price differentials appear to be the most important pull and deterrent factors 
respectively, explaining migration decisions.  
 This is followed by elasticity of migration with respect to unemployment and 
university education, at -1.15 and 1.15 respectively. Distance and regional amenities 
show low elasticities, all below 1. 
 Results show that inter-regional migration does respond to economic variables 
as expected.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Spanish internal migration has been fairly resistant to economic analysis for many 
decades. Numerous studies have pointed to its low levels and its lack of response to 
traditional or expected economic incentives. At times key variables such as 
unemployment and wages, supposed to unlock the secrets of internal migration, have 
even proved to be wrongly signed.  Encouraged by recent research on internal migration 
in other counties this paper has used an expanded model. The econometric results have 
proved all our tested variables significant. Thus our results show that Spanish regional 
migration in the period 1998-2003 responds to regional differentials in unemployment, 
wages, infrastructure, housing prices, and distance. Human capital is also shown to 
promote migration  
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Appendix 
Table A.1. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
     
Wage -2.660377 -19.22210 0.431858 1.693299 
  (0.138402)  (0.0906) 
Unem -1.038153 -22.31843 -1.245658 -25.85197 
  (0.046516)  (0.0000) 
Dis -0.705054 -35.93816 -0.858872 -45.30799 
  (0.019619)  (0.0000) 
Price   -1.344377 -15.58313 
    (0.0000) 
     
Fixed Effects     
     
Andalucía 12.58629  13.60523  
Aragón 9.780254  10.36180  
Asturias (Principado de) 10.18378  10.99422  
Balears (Illes) 10.31310  11.80235  
Canarias 11.68783  13.44449  
Cantabria 9.701412  10.84893  
Castilla-La Mancha 10.22457  10.86402  
Castilla y León 11.04220  11.99987  
Cataluña 11.89300  13.01061  
Comunidad Valenciana 11.52866  12.39893  
Extremadura 10.45113  11.22030  
Galicia 10.74086  11.77160  
Madrid (Comunidad de) 12.29680  13.21881  
Murcia (Región de) 9.906675  10.88587  
Navarra (Comunidad Foral de) 9.518049  10.06643  
País Vasco 11.23123  12.22189  
Rioja (La) 8.707055  9.554395  
     
Log likelihood -921.9080  -898.5032  
R-squared 0.497398  0.545268  
Adjusted R-squared 0.491474  0.539623  
S.E. of regression 0.941229  0.895562  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.988120  1.941961  
     
Number of Observations 1632  1632  
     
Note: Probability of t-statistics in parenthesis    
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Table A.2. 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
     
Wage 2.376549 9.641665 3.618143 10.43477 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Unem -1.117101 -25.30315 -1.156312 -19.00008 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Dis -0.899885 -53.23464 -0.832555 -44.12684 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Price -1.696188 -20.27534 -2.410421 -19.49458 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Univ 1.035988 18.57922 1.158605 13.86426 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Sec   0.576789 2.493366 
    (0.0128) 
Infra   0.518167 9.263997 
    (0.0000) 
Beds   0.637030 7.245017 
     
Fixed Effects     
     
Andalucía 17.42427  17.54610  
Aragón 14.20290  14.28261  
Asturias (Principado de) 14.77453  14.51587  
Balears (Illes) 15.91867  16.09401  
Canarias 17.64902  17.34204  
Cantabria 14.77607  14.49612  
Castilla-La Mancha 14.74616  14.97720  
Castilla y León 15.89337  15.89853  
Cataluña 16.82990  16.82079  
Comunidad Valenciana 16.33024  16.47840  
Extremadura 15.10304  15.15932  
Galicia 15.75074  15.39056  
Madrid (Comunidad de) 16.86657  16.95989  
Murcia (Región de) 14.95300  15.00382  
Navarra (Comunidad Foral de) 13.78118  13.70681  
País Vasco 15.86725  15.72679  
Rioja (La) 13.51550  13.56967  
     
Log likelihood -852.3644  -680.5916  
R-squared 0.576637  0.609764  
Adjusted R-squared 0.571115  0.602749  
S.E. of regression 0.864388  0.831176  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.948503  1.877003  
     
Number of Observations 1632  1360  
     
Note: Probability of t-statistics in parenthesis    
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Fig.1  
Inter-regional Migration in Spain
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